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Social Partnership: From Lemass to Cowen*
WILLIAM K. ROCHE
School of Business, University College Dublin
I
am honoured to present the 2008 Countess Markievicz Memorial Lecture.
The first woman elected to the House of Commons and Minister for Labour
in the First Dáil, Constance Markievicz lived in tumultuous times. I well
remember, some years ago, reading through the rather slim file in the State
Papers’ Office on the early work of the Department of Labour, where I came
across Constance Markievicz’s famous warning in 1921 of the imminence of
social revolution in Ireland.1
This was an era when the very basis and character of Irish society seemed
“up for grabs’. The dislocation to civil order caused by the War of
Independence, combined with the new-found strength and confidence of
workers in the booming rural economy of the First World War, had fuelled a
surge in industrial militancy, as well as a spate of factory and land seizures
throughout the country. Creamery workers plied their trade under the banner
“we make butter not profits’ while the establishment of a co-operative fishery
in Castleconnel inspired the newspaper headline: “Soviet eels in the
Shannon”!2
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1 For details of Markievicz’s memorandum to the cabinet see Arthur Mitchell, Labour in Irish
Politics 1890-1930, Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974, pp. 141-142.  
2 See Emmett O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland 1917-1923, Cork: Cork University Press, 1988,
Ch. 2.We live in less tumultuous times than these. Indeed the subject of my
lecture this evening, social partnership, has been associated with “low voltage”
politics, or what Peter Katzenstein has described as a “relatively dull and
predictable kind of politics”.3 Dull and predictable though it may be, especially
when contrasted with the “heroic” era of labour and industrial relations during
the first two decades of the twentieth century, the theme of social partnership
is of undoubted importance. It is of course important for Ireland, given that it
has been pivotal to industrial relations, politics and public policy over a period
of more than twenty years. While commentators differ on the weighting social
partnership should receive in accounting for Ireland’s economic recovery and
unprecedented performance over much of the period since, few deny that its
role was significant. Some indeed claim that it has fundamentally altered the
“rules of the game” of economic governance in modern Ireland.4 But Irish
social partnership is of more than national significance and interest. A salient
feature of the past twenty years has been the interest shown in the Irish case
by some of the most distinguished international scholars of the age in the
fields of industrial relations, politics and economics.5 Our subject matter,
therefore, is of no small importance, either for our understanding of modern
Ireland or for what may be learned from the Irish case with respect to “social
pacts” in general over the past two decades.  
So it seems appropriate to commemorate Constance Markievicz – a
political leader, active in the field of labour affairs – by examining the
interface between politics and industrial relations that has been such a key
dimension of social partnership. And I wish here to focus on the role of political
leaders in the development of the Irish social partnership model. 
I  SEAN LEMASS: CORPORATIST VISIONARY AND PRAGMATIST
It is standard to trace the advent of social partnership to the economic and
social crisis of the 1980s and to the signing of the Programme for National
Recovery (PNR) in 1987, with perhaps a passing reference to national pay
agreements and understandings during the 1970s. In the standard account
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3 Peter Katzenstein, 1985. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, p.32 and p. 87. 
4 See Rory O’Donnell, “Towards Post-Corporatist Concertation in Europe” in Helen Wallace (ed.),,
Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, London: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 305-321. 
5 For reviews of some key contributions to understanding aspects of the Irish model by
international scholars, see W. K. Roche., “Social Partnership in Ireland and New Social Pacts”,
Industrial Relations, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2007, pp 395-425; W. K. Roche, “Social Partnership and
Workplace Regimes in Ireland”, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2007, pp. 188-209.the names of Haughey and Ahern loom large as the twin political architects of
the social partnership model. I wish to suggest that to understand the origins
and lineage of social partnership we need to wind the clock back almost a half
century and to examine the towering figure of Sean Lemass, a founder of
Fianna Fail, long-serving government minister and eventual Taoiseach from
1959 to 1966.
During the 1930s Lemass was instrumental in mobilising trade union and
working-class support for Fianna Fail, as the new Party set out to create an
electoral support base across the social class spectrum. Lemass has been
described during this period as a “proto Keynesian” due to his support for
public spending and public works as ways of combating rising unemployment.6
Though he was disdainful of the Catholic corporatism of the war-time
Commission on Vocational Organisation, the transition to economic normalcy
following the war-time Emergency led Lemass to propose a series of radical
measures with strong corporatist leanings.7
He advocated a Keynesian approach to economic policy, involving the use
of public finance as an instrument for managing aggregate demand and
pursuing full employment.8 He sought to win employer and trade union
support for a new form of wage bargaining that would be co-ordinated with
national economic priorities and ultimately subservient to economic impera  -
tives.9 He canvassed the creation of works councils to give unions a role in
what he described as the “maintenance of factory discipline”.10 He tried to
establish an Industrial Efficiency Bureau to root out inefficient management
practices and to penalise recalcitrant proprietors and managers.11 He pro  -
posed the creation of industrial councils in which employers, union
representatives and third parties would co-operate to find ways of improving
industrial management and performance.12
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8 See especially Memorandum on Full Employment from Minister of Industry and Commerce, 16
January 1945, UCD Archives, McEntee Papers, P67/264. 
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1944; memorandum for Government, 23 October 1944, National Archives of Ireland (hereafter
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10 Memorandum on Full Employment from Minister of Industry and Commerce, 16 January 1945,
UCD Archives, McEntee Papers, P67/264, pp. 25-6. 
11 Explanatory Memorandum Relating to the Establishment of an Industrial Efficiency Bureau
and to Amend the Control of Prices Acts in certain Respects, 26 February 1946, NAI, Department
of the Taoiseach, S13814A. 
12 Industrial Prices and Efficiency Bill 1947, Part V, Development Councils for Industry, NAI
Department of the Taoiseach; Dail Debates Vol. 108 col. 733. Much of this endeavour came to grief in the face of opposition from
business and the public service, and not least, from more conservative
elements within Lemass’s own party.13 Lemass’s radical proposal in 1944 to
establish what he described as a “public authority” to supervise wage
determination was narrowed down, largely it seems on pragmatic grounds,
into a new system of dispute resolution.14 The result was the establishment of
the Labour Court in 1946 – Lemass drafting his outline for the Court at home
in a child’s copybook.15 The creation of the Labour Court was a radical enough
measure in its own right, but it was still a pale shadow of the wholesale
restructuring of wage bargaining originally envisaged by Lemass, and it was
not altogether consistent with his original aim.  
While Lemass’s post-war corporatist blueprint had failed politically by the
end of the 1940s, he continued to support centralised pay bargaining, and
brokered national pay agreements in 1948, 1957 and 1964.16 Blueprint
corporatism evolved into pragmatic corporatism. During the early 1960s
Lemass stimulated and supported moves from sections of business and the
public service to centralise collective bargaining and to create institutions that
would co-ordinate pay bargaining with economic policy.17 The explicit models
guiding these moves were the small European corporatist democracies, in
particular the Netherlands and Sweden. These moves also involved Ken
Whitaker, the chief architect behind the ending of protectionism and the
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First, the trade unions informed Lemass that they had no common policy on this area and would
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Union Congress, NAI, Department of Industry and Commerce, 14 February 1945, IR19). Second,
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Finally, Lemass and his civil servants feared the imminent end of war-time wage control in 1946
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15 See John Horgan, Sean Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1997, p.
123. 
16 See David O’Mahony, Economic Aspects of Industrial Relations, Dublin: Economic and Social
Research Institute, 1965. 
17 Sections of the FUE pressed for the creation of a ‘national economic council’ or ‘national labour
board’, to be modelled on the Dutch system of industrial relations. Speeches by Lemass on the
need for representatives of management and labour to reach a national understanding in their
approach to the development of the economy appear to have been a catalyst for the FUE’s
initiative. See Memorandum on the Proposed Establishment of a National Economic Council or
National Labour Board, NAI, Department of Industry and Commerce, W196CT.promotion of economic liberalisation. Whitaker envisaged active government
involvement in pay bargaining and the use of fiscal and monetary policy to
control inflationary pay pressures – for good measure recommending in 1961-
62 the abolition of the Labour Court in its existing voluntarist form.18
It bears emphasis that the Lemass-Whitaker proposals that crystallised
during the 1960s envisaged nothing short of the wholesale recasting of pay
bargaining and industrial relations in Ireland on the model of the European
corporatist democracies. The industrial relations reform proposals were a
significant feature of the wider economic development programme that Peter
Mair has aptly referred to as “Lemass-Whitaker corporatism”.19 The genesis of
this programme was rooted in the political volatility generated by persistent
economic stagnation, high unemployment and unremitting emigration from
the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. Fianna Fail had lost power to inter-
party governments between 1948-51 and again between 1954-57; and, for a
time, new political parties, in particular Clann na Poblachta, threatened the
Party’s electoral support base.20 It has been observed that one of Lemass’s
specific political objectives in that context involved rebuilding Fianna Fail’s
faltering support among its working-class base. This led Lemass to invite
union leaders to join such newly created corporatist institutions as the
National Industrial and Economic Council (NIEC) and the Committee on
Industrial Organisation.21 Union and working-class support was copper-
fastened by Fianna Fail’s “leftward shift” during the mid-1960s. This too was
engineered by Lemass and – though the point is more contentious – was seen
by some to have been responsible for a significant rise in social spending. Here
Lemass departed for political reasons from Whitaker’s more austere and
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Ireland. See A Preliminary Note on Wages Policy, June 1961, NAI, Department of Industry and
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Tripartite Council, 16 February 1962, in NAI, Department of Industry and Commerce, W196 CT4.  
19 Peter Mair, ‘Party Competition’ in Michael Laver, Peter Mair and Richard Sinnott eds., How
Ireland Voted 1987, Dublin: Poolbeg Press, pp. 30-47.
20 See Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, Sean Lemass and the Making of Modern Ireland 1945-66,
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1982; Peter Mair, The Changing Irish Party System, London: Frances
Pinter, 1987, pp. 51-5. 
21 Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, Sean Lemass and the Making of Modern Ireland 1945-66,
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1982, Ch. 6.orthodox insistence on prioritising so-called productive investment in public
spending programmes.22
But Lemass had seriously underestimated the challenge of transforming
the Irish industrial relations system. The National Employer-Labour
Conference, which had been spawned from the joint reforming efforts of
Lemass, Whitaker and sections of business, collapsed soon after its inception
in a row over incomes policy.23 It was to remain defunct until the 1970s when
it re-emerged as a forum for the negotiation of national pay agreements. The
NIEC also came unstuck over the issue of incomes policy.24 These and the
other bipartite and tripartite bodies sponsored by Lemass only marginally
impacted on economic governance and public policy. In effect, the various
corporatist institutions created in the ferment of institutional innovation from
the late 1950s to the mid-1960s had been bolted on to a system of pay
bargaining and industrial relations in which the centre of gravity continued to
be defined by unions’ faith in sectional free collective bargaining and most
employers’ willingness to accommodate such a posture.25
I have tried to capture the broad sweep of Lemass’s vision and practical
involvement in industrial relations. Though social partnership, as we now
know it, had yet to come into being, some of the key elements of the model are
evident in Lemass’s ideas and practical initiatives. Lemass sought to
centralise collective bargaining permanently and to align pay bargaining with
the pursuit of economic priorities. He envisaged an active role for the state in
pay determination. He canvassed the notion of union involvement in
industrial governance. He was an effective mediator, and brokered a number
of centralised pay agreements. He was the first Taoiseach to articulate “big
188 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
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Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1982, pp. 160-4. Cf. Kieran Allen, Fianna Fail and the Irish Labour
Movement, 1926 to the Present, London: Pluto Press, 1997, p. 114-5.
23 See Kurt Jacobsen, Chasing Progress in the Irish Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994, p. 81 and Charles McCarthy, The Decade of Upheaval: Irish Trade Unions in the
1960s, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1973, p. 50. 
24 Kurt Jacobsen, Chasing Progress in the Irish Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994, pp. 81-2.
25 The National Employer-Labour Conference, in particular, would have disappointed the would-
be reformers. The Council’s Economic Sub-Committee expressed scepticism about the need to
adopt ‘Continental systems of industrial relations’, concluding that ‘collective bargaining is the
method in Ireland and to follow the practices of other countries would require a complete recasting
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Sub-Committee of the National Employer-Labour Conference, July 1962, NAI, Department of
Industry and Commerce, W209. ideas” in the field of industrial relations, bringing the Department of the
Taoiseach into the arena in a significant way. It seems clear that neither he
nor Whitaker appreciated that “social compensation” and significant social
spending were important elements of corporatist arrangements in some of the
European states whose industrial relations institutions they wished Ireland to
emulate.26 It is doubtful that he ever envisaged the kind of formal and specific
trade-offs between employers, unions and the state now at the core of social
partnership programmes. But it is unlikely that he would have baulked at
these. His early support for Keynesianism pointed squarely in this direction,
as did his proposal prior to the 1964 national wage agreement that pay rises
might compensate for the effects of a new sales tax introduced by his
government and that a proportion of the rise in national output might be
channelled towards improvements in social welfare.27
While the direct lineage between Lemass’s corporatism and the current
social partnership model may be limited enough, overall, in reading Lemass’s
papers, it is quite startling that so much – especially so much that would
eventually come to pass – could emanate from the mind and imagination 
of a single politician in an age without “think-tanks”, expert advisors and all
the associated paraphernalia of the modern political and administrative
world.
II  LYNCH AND O’DONOGHUE AND THE KEYNESIAN INTERLUDE
Reviews of corporatist industrial relations systems or episodes in post-war
Europe reveal that they commonly coupled the search for pay restraint with
Keynesian economic policies.28 The basic idea involved compensating unions
for pay moderation by increasing public and social spending, and by creating
jobs, especially in the public sector. Ireland was different. Short of the residual
Keynesianism involved in the introduction of capital budgeting by the first
Irish inter-party government, and the “improvised” Keynesianism of Lemass’s
famed “shift to the left” in the mid 1960s, such ideas carried little weight in
Irish public policy or economic management until the second half of the
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26 Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985, pp. 47-57.
27 Irish Times, 7 and 21 December 1963. 
28 See Franz Traxler, Sabine Blasche and Bernhard Kittel, National Labour Relations in
Internationalized Markets: A Comparative Study of Institutions, Change and Performance,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, Ch. 10. 1970s.29 Jack Lynch, Lemass’s anointed successor as Taoiseach, was an
industrial relations conservative during his spell as Minister for Industry and
Commerce – in sharp contrast with his patron’s role in that department.30 But
ironically Lynch was now to become party to a significant Keynesian-style
experiment in tripartite wage bargaining, as his Government attempted to
stimulate economic recovery in the shadow of the recession brought about by
the first oil crisis.31
Ireland’s foray into Keynesian policy measures allied with the search for
pay moderation and a new form of industrial relations was to be short and
highly inglorious. Pay bargaining was eventually centralised in 1970 in
response to mounting employer and government concerns about the
inflationary impact of decentralised pay rounds and in response to the trauma
inflicted on unions by the cataclysmic maintenance dispute of 1969. The
pattern throughout the 1970s involved national pay bargaining, issuing in
nine successive national agreements up to 1981. Over the course of the decade
national pay agreements became progressively tripartite in character. At first
both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael-Labour coalition governments bargained at
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29 On the influence of Keynesian ideas on Whitaker and among sections of the Department of
Finance in the early post-war period and on the introduction of capital budgeting, see Ronan
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Cormac O’Grada equates the drift towards economic ‘programming’ and associated macro-
economic policy from the late 1950s with experimental Keynesianism, but he also traces the
limited impact of the Keyenesian fiscal paradigm on economic policy makers up to the late 1970s.
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Lynch’s response to a proposal by Erskine Childers, Minister for Transport and Power, that the
‘Dutch system’ of industrial relations merited examination and emulation. Lynch’s reply to
Childers, strongly influenced by his Department’s advice that a change in the present system
relating to the fixing of wage levels was ‘outside the realm of practical politics’, stated: ‘My view
is that the present system under which wages and conditions of employment are negotiated
largely by employers and workers with a minimum of interference from the State is the one most
suitable to our conditions and that it should not be disturbed’. In NAI Department of Industry and
Commerce, W153, Letter from Lynch to Childers 20 October 1959. The posture of Lynch and his
Department are also outlined in Memorandum – Minister for Transport and Power’s Suggestion
for the Introduction of Wage Fixing Machinery, 8 October 1959, Collaboration Between Workers,
Employers and the State in Regard to Wages, 30 October 1959. 
31 For an examination of the background to the Lynch-O’Donoghue programme, see Dermot
Keogh, Jack Lynch: A Biography, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2008, pp. 403-8; Andrew McCarthy,
‘Lynch and Economic Policy’, paper presented to ‘Jack Lynch: Politics and Sport, Personality and
Leadership’ (unpublished), University College Cork, Department of History, 3-4 October 2008. arms length with unions and employers by offering budgetary concessions in
the areas of tax and social welfare to reward moderate pay rises. One observer
of this development was led to remark that the near formal coupling of
budgetary policy with pay bargaining in the mid 1970s (by the Fine Gael-
Labour Coalition of the day) might eventually come to be seen in retrospect as
one of the most profound changes in the practice of democratic government in
the history of the state.32 But retrospect allows us to see this development as
but a modest move along the road to formal tripartite bargaining. 
Underlying the growing politicisation of pay bargaining was the advent of
what has variously been described as “bastardised”, “vulgar” “mangled” or
“textbook” Keynesianism.33 Fianna Fail’s landslide victory in the 1977 general
election was the springboard for the first and only truly Keynesian interlude
in Irish pay bargaining. A highly expansionary fiscal policy, masterminded by
Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Martin O’Donoghue, and
funded by sharply rising public debt, provided the basis for tripartite
agreements intended to reward pay restraint with job creation and other
economic concessions. This process culminated in the so-called National
Understandings for Economic and Social Development of 1979 and 1980.
Through such developments Ireland was belatedly following the path of a
number of West European countries that had sought to couple pay moderation
withgovernmentpoliciesdesignedto boostdemand and reduce unemploy  ment. 
The experiment was, of course, an economic and industrial relations
disaster. Ray MacSharry subsequently sought to defend the underlying
economic strategy by pointing out that the original plan had resembled a two-
stage rocket. Stage 1 was intended to prime economic recovery through deficit
spending, while stage 2 was intended to generate the tax buoyancy required to
repay the increased public debt incurred. Stage 2 never fired, as the
Keynesian rocket was thrown off course by the second oil crisis.34
This account may be plausible as far as it goes. But relevant also was the
highly unstable and profligate nature of the tripartite pay bargaining that had
evolved during the decade. Governments had become prone to buying off
pressure by offering inconsistent and ultimately unsustainable concessions to
a range of different interest groups. Unions and employers had never arrived
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32 See James F. O’Brien, A Study of National Wage Agreements in Ireland, Dublin: Economic and
Social Research Institute, 1981. p. 144.
33 The terms appear respectively in Joe Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 467; A Rocky Road: The Irish Economy Since the 1920s,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, p. 230; Dermot Keogh, Jack Lynch: A Biography,
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2008, p 405; Kieran Allen, Fianna Fail and the Irish Labour
Movement, 1926 to the Present, London: Pluto Press, 1997, p. 152.
34 Ray MacSharry and Padraic White, The Making of the Celtic Tiger: Inside Ireland’s Boom
Economy, Cork: Mercier Press, 2000, p. 49. at anything resembling a common analysis of the roots of the mounting
economic crisis.35 Both parties were unable or disinclined to deliver on their
pledges in the areas of pay moderation or industrial peace. “Second-tier” pay
bargaining or “pay drift” became standard.36 In those charmed days many
could hope for three annual pay rises each year: an increment, a national pay
rise and an “anomaly”, “special” or “productivity” award. While employers and
governments complained of the bad faith of union leaders, trade union
members saw little reason to moderate their pay demands against a
background of high inflation and an escalating income tax burden. Industrial
conflict, or working-class militancy as some might prefer to portray it, reached
a historical peak during the decade.37 The PAYE movement, which had
brought huge numbers onto the streets to protest against the sharp rise in
income tax, almost overwhelmed union leaders and the centralised bargaining
to which they were party.38 Now that centralised bargaining with active
government involvement had arrived, Lemass’s corporatist vision seemed
more like an anarchical nightmare. 
By the early 1980s none of the parties to the tripartite accords were
convinced that their interests had been well served, and each was more or less
critical of what they saw as the bad faith of the other parties. Small wonder
then that, in the words of an employer leader of the time, national pay
bargaining eventually “collapsed under its own weight” in 1981.39 Ireland had
by then entered the most serious and sustained economic and social crisis in
its modern history. 
III  CHARLES HAUGHEY AND THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL
PARTNERSHIP  
That crisis and its profound impact on state, union and employer postures
altered fundamentally the rules of pay bargaining and state engagement and
led to the genesis of the current social partnership model. The kinds of
institutional arrangements envisaged by Lemass but lying beyond his grasp
were now to become mainstream features of Irish industrial relations. 
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37 Teresa Brannick, Linda Doyle and Aidan Kelly, ‘Industrial Conflict’, in Thomas Murphy and
William K. Roche eds, Irish Industrial Relations in Practice, Dublin: Oaktree Press, 1997, pp. 
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38 Dermot Ferriter, The Transformation of Ireland, 1990-2000, Dublin: Profile Books, 2005, 
pp. 667-9.
39 Conversation with Eugene McCarthy, former Director, Federated Union of Employers.Enter Charles Haughey – whether at stage left or stage right remains a
matter of some contention! In the final years of his life Haughey appeared to
view his role in securing the PNR and launching the social partnership era as
an important, or even as the most important, aspect of his political legacy.40
Recent commentary on the genesis of social partnership has tended to reflect
this view: portraying Haughey as something of a social partnership visionary,
whose perspicacity was fundamental in paving the way for the “Celtic Tiger”.41
The sociologist Kieran Allen has portrayed Haughey in less flattering
terms, suggesting that he was already a convinced “monetarist” on his election
as leader of Fianna Fail in 1979.42 But Haughey’s alleged monetarism or fiscal
conservatism, as Allen himself has well documented, amounted in practice to
a very flexible posture indeed, and one that permitted him to engage in a
variety of fiscally reckless political and industrial relations deals or “strokes”,
aimed at securing short-run advantage and at buying off pressure.43
Rather than viewing Haughey as a fiscal conservative, or as a monetarist
in corporatist “drag”, wedded to little more that the rhetoric of social
partnership, it appears more valid to view him as a political opportunist or
“political adventurer” (Allen’s term again).44 And I wish to suggest that it was
more as a political opportunist than as a monetarist or corporatist visionary
that Haughey embraced social partnership in 1987. 
In the teeth of the 1980s economic and social crisis, Haughey had been
persuaded to enter an informal accord with the Irish Congress of Trade Unions
(ICTU) on the strength of Congress’s 1984 strategy document, Confronting the
Jobs Crisis. He famously chaired the first meeting between the Fianna Fail
front bench and the ICTU Executive to have taken place since the era of Sean
Lemass – a meeting at which each side discovered that they could “do
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Press, 1997, p. 173. business” with the other.45 While Haughey stridently opposed the curbs on
public spending introduced by the Fitzgerald-Spring Coalition and encouraged
public sector unions in their militant opposition to curbs on pay, by 1986 he
appears to have become convinced of the need for fiscal discipline on foot of the
advice proffered by a group of economists from whom he had sought counsel.46
This advice was hardly revelatory. With the publication of the iconic National
Economic and Social Council (NESC) Document, A Strategy for Development,
if not before, the supreme challenge of regaining control over public debt and
spending had become a matter of near consensus across the political
spectrum.47
While Fianna Fail campaigned on a strongly corporatist platform in the
1987 general election – advocating a return to national pay bargaining – after
the election, Haughey ignored a commitment to the ICTU to consult with it
prior to framing his Government’s first budget, and famously announced
spending cuts well in excess of those mooted by Fine Gael in the dying days of
the outgoing Coalition.48 Though the political attractions of tying the unions
into a programme that involved acute cuts in public spending were obvious, it
was Haughey’s trusted Departmental Secretary, Padraig O hUiginn, who
persuaded him that an acceptable deal could be done with ICTU, and that the
Party’s corporatist pact with the unions was indeed capable of realisation now
that the election was past.49 Haughey may well have been prepared to
implement deep spending cuts without union agreement – as suggested by the
announcement of a second round of spending cuts in 1988 in the face of
protests from the unions that these had not been trailed during talks on the
PNR.50 It became part of the mythology surrounding the PNR that Haughey
had secured the deal by “strong-arming” employer leaders into accepting the
pay agreement. The reality was that the Federated Union of Employers
(FUE), while harbouring reservations about some aspects of the agreement –
not least about Haughey’s commitment to fiscal discipline – were well satisfied
with the modest pay deal on offer.51
194 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
45 Tim Hastings, Brian Sheehan and Padraig Yeates, Saving the Future: How Social Partnership
Shaped Ireland’s Economic Success, Dublin: Blackhall Publishing, 2007, p. 33.
46 See Stephen Collins, The Haughey File, Dublin: O’Brien Press, 1992, p. 86. and pp. 95-6. 
47 National Economic and Social Council Document, A Strategy for Development, 1986-1990,
Dublin: NESC, 1986.
48 See Stephen Collins, The Haughey File, Dublin: O’Brien Press, 1992, pp. 128-30.
49 Ray MacSharry and Padraic White, The Making of the Celtic Tiger: Inside Ireland’s Boom
Economy, Cork: Mercier Press, 2000, p. 126.
50 Industrial Relations News, 22 and 29 October 1987.
51 Interview by Tim Hastings of Dan McAuley, former Director General of the Federated Union of
Employers, 9 August 2006. (I am indebted to Dr. Tim Hastings for making available transcripts of
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these.)   While Haughey’s leadership in brokering the PNR was undoubtedly
significant, it bears emphasis as well that the economic policies that
underpinned the Programme were not his policies, nor those of his erstwhile
economic advisors. The policies enshrined in the PNR had been jointly
developed by union and employer leaders and civil servants on the National
Economic and Social Council. These policies prioritised reducing public debt;
disavowed the “fiscal activism” that had underpinned the ill-fated Lynch-
O’Donoghue experiment, stressed the importance of a non-accommodating
exchange rate policy and emphasised the need to maintain competitiveness.52
More than vision, philosophical coherence and consistency or perspicacity,
realpolitik dominated Haughey’s role in the genesis of social partnership. The
crisis in public expenditure could no longer be ignored – consensus on the issue
leading Fine Gael to support government policy in the “Tallaght Strategy”.53
If vision or perspicacity played a role in the genesis of social partnership,
we must look elsewhere for the real visionaries. Perhaps these were the
figures who had hammered out the 1986 NESC strategy. A case could also be
made for a small group of union leaders, such as Peter Cassells, Billy Attley
and Phil Flynn, who had staged something of a “palace coup” within the ICTU
to win support for a return to centralised tripartite bargaining. The employers
had made it clear that their choice between a centralised deal and the
continuation of company-level bargaining essentially came down to the terms
of the pay deal on offer. The PNR was effectively a deal reached between
government and a group of union leaders who had become fearful of unions’
growing marginalisation in the face of the new electoral strength of neo-
liberalism, represented in Ireland by the rise of the Progressive Democrats
(PDs).54
IV  SPRING AND BRUTON: ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY 
The PNR provided the basic paradigm for subsequent social partnership
programmes. That paradigm involved a common analysis of Ireland’s
economic challenges; moderate nominal pay rises tied to reductions in
personal taxation; government pledges across a range of economic and social
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membership of the single currency.55
That paradigm was extended in a significant way in the mid-1990s by the
involvement of civil society groups in social partnership at the instigation of
Labour’s Dick Spring and Fine Gael’s John Bruton. Scholars examining the
background to the engagement of civil society in social partnership have
identified the political elite’s search for legitimacy as the main motive during
a period when the level of unemployment and the incidence of poverty
remained persistently high.56 I believe this observation to be sound, but would
emphasise also that this influence interacted with a long-running concern
with democratic accountability, especially within Fine Gael, and a more recent
concern with the exclusionary proclivities of social partnership, more or less
shared by both Fine Gael and Labour. 
Concern with the democratic accountability of social partnership has been
an abiding issue within Fine Gael and has made for considerable ambivalence
in the Party’s stance on the process. During the 1960s Garret FitzGerald had
been critical of what he termed the “vocational-bureaucratic system of
government” preferred by Lemass.57 Fine Gael’s concern with democratic
accountability can also be traced to FitzGerald’s reluctance to deal directly
with trade unions and to engage in national pay bargaining while Taoiseach
in the Fine Gael-Labour Coalition during the 1980s. Fitzgerald has recorded
in his memoirs that his aim as Taoiseach during the 1980s crisis had been to
bring down inflation as a prelude to engaging with unions, at a time when he
had reason to believe that some at least of their key leaders were reluctant in
any event to countenance a national agreement with the Coalition.58 Union
leaders recall the period differently, some subsequently complaining that
FitzGerald and his senior ministers, including John Bruton, had recoiled from
the whole idea of such an accord between the state and unions.59
There can be little doubt that FitzGerald showed a preference for tackling
economic problems in an essentially technocratic manner by seeking advice
from the “great and the good”, unencumbered by consultation or the search for
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the Fine Gael-Labour Coalition had not demurred from FitzGerald’s posture,
and possibly more than FitzGerald himself openly valued Fine Gael’s liberal
legacy, with its emphasis on the primacy of the Dail and the cabinet in
formulating and implementing government policy.61
In the case of the Labour Party, the memoirs of Ruairi Quinn and Fergus
Finlay all bitterly recall union leaders’ attacks on Labour ministers, during a
time when the Labour Party in government had, as they saw it, fought hard
to moderate spending cuts and to protect the least advantaged.62 The
bitterness of senior Labour Party’ figures at ICTU’s apparent unwillingness to
countenance a national agreement with the FitzGerald-Spring Coalition, but
subsequent enthusiasm for reaching a national accord with Fianna Fail, is
hardly less muted.63
The debate in the Dail on the second social partnership programme, The
Programme for Economic and Social Progress (1991-93), seemed to point to the
advent of something approaching all-party consensus, encompassing even the
PDs, on the substantive merits of the social partnership model.64 Fine Gael
and Labour nevertheless harboured a more or less shared concern, which they
voiced inside the Dail chamber, about the need for a parliamentary input into
the process of reaching deals on social partnership programmes. John Bruton
in particular was critical of the fact that the Dail was unable to amend or alter
any aspect of agreements reached between government and the social
partners.65 Bruton had also been critical of the social partnership process for
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65 Dail Debates, Vol. 405, 19 February 1991, Cols. 737-9.favouring the economically and politically powerful over less powerful groups,
particularly the unemployed.66 Reflecting its own particular concern about
democratic accountability Labour had called for the creation of an Oireachtas
Economic and Social Affairs Committee to provide a mechanism for a
parliamentary input into the partnership process.67
Labour and Fine Gael were subsequently instrumental in extending the
social partnership model to incorporate Oireachtas members, as well as civil
society groups active in the community and voluntary sectors. As Tanaiste in
the Fianna Fail-Labour Coalition of 1992-94, Dick Spring inserted into the
parties’ programme for government a proposal to create a National Economic
and Social Forum (NESF). The new NESF comprised members of the
Oireachtas and community and voluntary groups, and was charged with
providing advice for government on unemployment and related social policy
concerns. Following the creation of the Rainbow Coalition of Fine Gael, Labour
and Democratic Left in 1994, John Bruton as Taoiseach appointed
representatives from the community and voluntary sector to the NESC – the
strategic brain of the social partnership process. He subsequently invited a
number of the community and voluntary groups to participate in the talks
process that would lead to the Partnership 2000 agreement in 1997.68 Social
partnership now had its “social pillar”.
The degree to which the objectives of democratic accountability and what
Spring had described as “wider participation in democracy” have been well
served by the involvement of public representatives and civil society groups in
social partnership remains debatable.69 While some commentators have made
much of the participation of civil society groups in distinguishing Irish social
partnership from other European social pacts, the impact of the institutional
changes involved appears on the whole to have been modest. Community and
voluntary groups have remained very much subordinate to the main economic
interest groups in the workings of the process, while the democratic
accountability of the process continues to be a moot point.70 The Dail
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Continued“Committee that had been intended to provide oversight of the social
partnership process was never created, its function subsumed in what seems
a highly diluted form by the NESF. And over the course of the partnership
programmes as a whole, direct Oireachtas input, debate and oversight of the
programmes has dropped away considerably. 
V  BERTIE AHERN AND PARTNERSHIP’S “SOCIAL TURN” 
More than any other politician since Lemass, Bertie Ahern’s fingerprints
are all over social partnership. Not only was he involved in negotiating six of
the seven social partnership programmes to date, it was Ahern who did the
spadework for Fianna Fail’s formative accord with the unions in the mid-
1980s. During this period, Ahern, by his own account, had come to admire
Scandinavian economic and industrial relations models, much like Lemass a
generation earlier.71 More than any other modern political leader Ahern has
consistently espoused social partnership and has identified himself politically
with its successes, and even with its invention. How then are we to assess his
specific contribution as a political leader to the development of the social
partnership model? 
Like Lemass, Ahern was manifestly a gifted mediator and conciliator and,
particularly as Taoiseach, was a steady hand on the tiller in steering talks on
successive agreements towards successful completion. However to focus
mainly on Ahern the mediator and negotiator would be to misrepresent his
contribution, particularly as three exceptional civil servants, Padraig O
hUiginn, Paddy Teahon and Dermot McCarthy, have been the really pivotal
mediators and brokers of successive social partnership agreements since 1987.   
Nor is it easy to find in Ahern’s involvement in social partnership any
compelling evidence of significant initiatives in institution-building or design.
The increasingly complex institutional architecture associated with the social
partnership system has grown very much in an incremental way – pro  -
grammes building on earlier programmes by adding new institutions and
processes to the evolving edifice.72 The entry of civil society groups into the
process had not occurred on Bertie Ahern’s watch as Taoiseach, nor at his
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vision or institutional design, or indeed of the pragmatic institutional
engineering, that were so prominent in the record and legacy of Sean Lemass. 
If we turn from process and institutions to examine the strategic aims and
priorities of the social partnership programmes, we find that for much of the
period since 1987 these were fashioned by the NESC in response to changing
economic challenges. And the evolving NESC priorities and programmes were
more or less endorsed by governments and parties of all political hues. 
But we encounter one major area or juncture where a decisive act of
political leadership by Bertie Ahern was to have a significant impact on the
direction and priorities of social partnership and of public policy more
generally. In what might be referred to as the “social turn” in social
partnership, during 2004-2005, Ahern, like a latter-day Lemass, repositioned
Fianna Fail leftwards, with significant consequences for the prioritisation of
social policy objectives within the current partnership programme and in
other ways. 
The background to the “social turn” and its main political spur was the
very poor showing of Fianna Fail in the local and European elections in 2004,
when the party’s vote fell to its lowest level since 1927.73 This was attributed
by sections of the party to the rightwards drift in government policy during the
two Fianna Fail-PD coalitions holding power since 1997.74 In the second of
these coalitions Charlie McCreevy, as Minister for Finance and Mary Harney,
as Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment, formed a powerful axis
that tilted economic priorities towards the liberal right – if in a somewhat
erratic or circuitous way, the liberal duo having to operate under the watchful
eyes of Ahern as the political guarantor of social partnership.75
Described as “every bit as committed to PD policies as the PDs
themselves”, McCreevy had provoked rows with the unions over tax policies
that often appeared to favour middle and high income earners.76 He also stood
out from the political herd by stating baldly that he derived his mandate from
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Macmillan, 2005, p. 190.the electorate and – by implication – not from NESC strategies or from
commitments entered into under social partnership programmes.77 McCreevy
had further made it clear that his understanding of the objective of “social
inclusion” meant catering for people in “greatest need” – a definition that was
significantly more restrictive than the rather vague but nonetheless more
expansive social priorities inserted into social partnership programmes from
the mid 1990s.78 McCreevy showed little patience either with what he termed
the “poverty industry” and was hostile in particular to the analysis and
demands of CORI (The Conference of Religious in Ireland) – the social pillar’s
most vocal and articulate advocate.79 Harney had stoked controversy over
cutbacks in local community employment schemes and over an “employment
action plan” that seemed to some to herald the advent of US-style
“workfare”.80 Though as a senior economics minister, operating within social
partnership, she was party to at least a version of “Berlin”, she had famously
announced her “spiritual” preference for “Boston” when it came to charting the
direction of economic policy.81
Following Fianna Fail’s poor showing in the 2004 local and European
elections, Ahern invited CORI’s Director to address the annual Autumn
Fianna Fail “think-in” at Inchydony in Cork.82 This symbolic act might have
counted for little had it not been followed by a Cabinet reshuffle. Charlie
McCreevy, the lightning rod of the Party’s right-wing faction, was replaced as
Minister for Finance by Brian Cowen. What one political commentator
described as the “purge of the liberals” was completed by Seamus Brennan’s
removal from the Department of Transport.83 Brennan had clashed with
unions over his plans to liberalise the transport sector, and his decision in
2003 to break up Aer Rianta had thrown talks on the second phase of
Sustaining Progress into crisis.84 Over and above the shock delivered to the
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84 Industrial Relations News, 24 June 2004.Party by the 2004 elections, there seemed to be a growing appreciation of the
increasing electoral significance of social issues such as health, education,
transport and of the quality of public services and public infrastructure.85
It is easy – perhaps too easy – to parody the “Drumcondra socialism”
espoused by Ahern during this period.86 But the substantive outcomes were
significant: a series of budgets that were more redistributive than those
introduced by McCreevy; the expansive ten-year social programme contained
in the T2016 social partnership agreement, and the inclusion of a social
expenditure programme in the 2007-2013 National Development Plan.87
Perhaps it is not surprising that the supreme political strategist and
tactician of his generation should have exercised decisive political leadership
over the focus and priorities of social partnership above all in response to
electoral pressures that pointed to people’s growing concern with the quality
of public and social services and with the issue of social cohesion in the most
general sense. More than to the persistent lobbying of groups in the social
pillar, or than to NESC’s growing emphasis on the economic significance of
“social capital”, partnership’s “social turn” can be attributed to Ahern the
politician and political strategist. 
VI  BRIAN COWEN – A MORE INSTRUMENTAL POSTURE?
Following his appointment as Minister of Finance in Ahern’s 2004
government reshuffle, Brian Cowen expressed strong support for the social
partnership model.88 His budgets spearheaded the social thrust of Fianna
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88 Industrial Relations News, 28 April, 2005. Fail’s political strategy post-2004. As Taoiseach Brian Cowen worked hard to
secure the continuation of T2016 and praised the September 2008 “transi  -
tional agreement” for contributing to confidence and stability. He was also
forthright during the difficult negotiations in stating that he did not fear
governing without an agreement.
On becoming leader of Fianna Fail and Taoiseach earlier in the year,
Cowen invoked the legacy of Lemass, albeit by commending Lemass’s espousal
of patriotism.89 Cowen’s political ideology has been described as opaque. In the
few available utterances of his political credo, some commentators identified a
seeming endorsement of values consistent with the European social market
model.90 But they also doubted the depth of Cowen’s convictions, and
particularly his inclination to defend these values in an economic downturn.
Subsequent events may well have borne out such scepticism. David Begg has
described ICTU’s forlorn attempt in talks on the recent pay agreement to 
win support from the Government and employers for the idea of a “solidarity
pact” that would have involved flat rate pay rises and a coherent public
spending programme focused on the least advantaged – a concept with deep
roots in European social democracy.91 No such coherence, nor little such focus,
has been evident in the Cowen Government’s subsequent austerity
programme. 
Rather than seeing Cowen as a kind of Fianna Fail style instinctive social
democrat, I think a stronger case can be made for portraying the centre of
gravity of his political ideology, as so far revealed, as closer to the European
Christian democratic tradition. In interviews with his recent biographer
Cowen has spoken of the relevance of Christian values in a secular world; 
he has endorsed the importance of community and voluntary effort and 
has expressed his concern to avoid an overweening state. He has also
professed support for equality of opportunity and for the promotion of social
cohesion.92 The tradition here evident involves a more conservative and
residual posture towards social policy and the proper scope of state
involvement.93
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preservation of social partnership in bad times as in good. As the financial and
economic crisis has deepened during recent weeks, he has several times
emphasised the importance of social partnership. But behind this seeming
endorsement of social partnership, one detects that Brian Cowen is also posing
a question: can the social partnership model effectively address and survive
new and unprecedented pressures and challenges? 
These challenges include the likelihood of further tax rises, demands by
employers for greater scope for pay agreements to vary across sectors, and
downward pressure on current pay levels. Also in the background is the urgent
political issue of public service reform – an area in which the present
partnership paradigm has not been notably successful. 
In the current context Cowen’s posture towards social partnership seems
more open and certainly instrumental than was Ahern’s, and the social
partnership model is clearly less central to his political identity and
reputation. Time will tell whether Cowen presides over a redirection and
reconfigura  tion of social partnership in a new and very serious crisis, or over
its demise. But whether, in his eyes, significant outcomes, economic, fiscal and
political, are achievable in the short- and medium-term will likely decide the
matter. 
VII  POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 
It seems appropriate to conclude where we began by recalling the
corporatist vision and pragmatism of Sean Lemass. While his own efforts to
transform collective bargaining and industrial relations ended mainly in
failure, much of what Lemass had envisaged in the Ireland of his time has
come to pass during the last two decades. 
Primed by the crisis of the 1980s and spurred by the unprecedented
economic success of the 1990s, industrial relations in Ireland began to function
along similar lines to the small corporatist democracies of Europe. The Irish
system of collective bargaining has been transformed to a significant extent in
the direction of models pioneered historically by countries like the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and the Scandinavian states. Of course the
models prevailing in these countries have also changed in recent decades, not
least in the dilution of their social and redistributive priorities. And some have
indeed collapsed altogether, most notably in the case of Sweden.
Some observers, especially within the “court” of social partnership, have
put forward the view that the Irish model is now qualitatively distinct from
models developed either historically or recently in other countries. They claim
204 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWthat Irish social partnership involves a quite new form of politics or new mode
of governance in the broadest sense that they label “post-corporatist”.94 I have
been, and I remain, critical of this view. It seems to me to exaggerate the
degree of novelty displayed by the Irish model, either when compared with
past or recent experience in other countries.95 And the loftier claims of
commentators sympathetic to this view fail to pass muster when confronted
with empirical evidence on the functioning of national, local and workplace
partnership.96
But while no qualitatively new form of politics or governance are involved
in social partnership, there can be no doubt that politics and political
leadership have been pivotal in forging the visions, strategies, opportunism
and improvisation that have so profoundly changed industrial relations in
Ireland over the past half century.
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